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ESSAY 
THE INVISIBLE HAND IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 
Adrian Vermeule*
INTRODUCTION 
HAT do the separation of powers, free speech, the adversary 
system of litigation, criminal procedure, the common law, 
and property rights have in common? In all of these cases and oth-
ers, theorists have offered invisible-hand justifications for legal and 
political institutions, comparing them to explicit economic markets. 
Invariably, other theorists sharply criticize the invocation of the in-
visible hand. Yet the debates are largely localized, with few com-
parisons across contexts and no general and accepted account of 
how invisible-hand justifications might work. In general, although 
there is a literature that defines the structure of invisible-hand ex-
planations, the normative use of invisible-hand arguments as a jus-
tification for legal and political institutions is much less explored. 
W 
This essay has two aims. The first is to identify general condi-
tions under which an invisible-hand justification of legal and politi-
cal institutions will succeed, in the modest sense that it is internally 
coherent and plausible (whether or not true in fact). The second 
aim is to identify several theoretical puzzles about invisible-hand 
justifications that cut across the local contexts in which such justifi-
cations are offered. I believe these puzzles are, in fact, genuine and 
irreducible dilemmas, which arise from the very structure and na-
ture of invisible-hand reasoning. Moreover, they can arise in the 
context of explicit economic markets as well. Although in some 
cases invisible-hand justifications fail because the analogy to mar-
* John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Alon Harel, Re-
becca Haw, Daryl Levinson, Jacob Levy, Barak Medina, Eric Posner, Emma Roths-
child, David Strauss, Mark Tushnet, Eyal Zamir and participants at a faculty work-
shop at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for helpful comments, and to Sergei 
Zaslavsky for helpful research assistance. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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kets fails, these dilemmas arise when the analogy works only too 
well. 
Part I defines invisible-hand justifications, illustrates their use in 
various contexts in legal and political theory, and specifies neces-
sary conditions for such justifications to be cogent, whether or not 
they are true or useful. 
Part II discusses the dilemma of norms. Norms of truth-seeking, 
public-regarding action or altruism can both promote and under-
mine the workings of the invisible hand in the relevant institutions. 
Although it is abstractly possible to identify the conditions under 
which one effect or the other will predominate, the relevant norms 
are lumpy and cannot be fine-tuned sufficiently well to capture all, 
but only, those conditions under which norms are beneficial. 
Part III discusses the dilemma of second best. In a range of in-
teresting cases, partial compliance with the conditions for an in-
visible-hand justification produces the worst of all possible worlds. 
The result is that such justifications have a knife-edged quality: ei-
ther a move to full compliance or a move to full rejection will 
prove superior to the intermediate case of partial compliance. 
Where this is so, institutional designers face an all-or-nothing 
choice. 
Part IV discusses the dilemma of verification. In many cases, 
theorists claim that an invisible-hand process functions as a 
Hayekian discovery procedure, producing information that a cen-
tralized decisionmaker could not obtain. The question whether that 
claim holds is empirical, but it begs the question to judge the suc-
cess of the invisible-hand process by comparing it to the body of in-
formation held by any single mind (such as the analyst’s) or by 
some centralized institution. It follows that invisible-hand justifica-
tions resting on informational benefits will have a speculative qual-
ity, but by the same token it is difficult to assemble decisive evi-
dence against them. 
I. INVISIBLE-HAND JUSTIFICATIONS 
The most famous invisible-hand justification was pioneered by 
Adam Smith
1 and later elaborated in neoclassical economics: under 
1 There is a large body of literature on what exactly Smith meant by his evocative, 
but unsystematic, references to the “invisible hand,” and how exactly his metaphor VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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conditions of perfect competition, markets will produce allocative 
and productive efficiency, and hence Pareto efficiency. In Friedrich 
Hayek’s variant of the argument for markets, the market orders 
the decentralized information and tacit knowledge distributed 
throughout society, coordinating individual plans better than could 
any central planner.
2 Legal and political theorists have adapted 
these arguments and their relatives to offer invisible-hand justifica-
tions for a range of institutions. Here are some of the most promi-
nent, although the list is by no means comprehensive: 
●  Influenced by Adam Smith and other figures of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, James Madison argued that the separation of pow-
ers would protect liberty as the unintended byproduct of a system 
in which “ambition [is] made to counteract ambition.”
3
●  Following Madison, modern theorists have argued that the 
separation of powers system produces a “spontaneous order” 
through Coasean bargaining among lawmaking institutions.
4
●  Madison and other Framers of the Constitution were suspi-
cious of political parties, on the traditional civic-republican ground 
that parties are harmful “factions.” Following Hume, however, 
Madison recognized that the cure for the evils of party might be 
competition among multiple parties.
5 Under pluralism in a large 
federal republic, each party serves as a check upon the others;
6 the 
relates to modern economics. See, e.g., William D. Grampp, What Did Smith Mean 
by the Invisible Hand?, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 441, 444–50 (2000). Nothing in the analysis 
here turns on how such questions are answered. 
2 F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 524–26 
(1945). 
3 The Federalist No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987). For the 
influence of Smith on Madison, see Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception 
Among the American Founders, 1776–1790, 59 Wm. & Mary Q. 897, 905–15 (2002); 
David Prindle, The Invisible Hand of James Madison, 15 Const. Pol. Econ. 223, 231–
34 (2004). 
4 John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and 
War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 293, 303 (1993). 
5 See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 322 (“In the extended 
republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and 
sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom 
take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good . . . .”). 
For Madison’s debt to Hume, see Nancy L. Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: 
An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship 70–71 (2008). 
6 See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 127–28; James Madi-
son, Parties, Nat’l Gazette, Jan. 23, 1792, reprinted in James Madison: Writings 504–05 VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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unintended byproduct of their interaction is freedom from majori-
tarian oppression and promotion of the “general good.”
7
●  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., adapting an idea devel-
oped by John Stuart Mill,
8 argued for free speech on the ground 
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.”
9 Truth arises as an un-
intended byproduct of the marketplace of ideas. 
●  A close relative of Holmes’s approach is Alexander Bickel’s 
analysis of the struggle between government and journalists over 
the disclosure of classified government information. Bickel argued 
for a regime in which government may prosecute officials who leak 
government information, but would be barred by free speech prin-
ciples from prosecuting reporters for publishing such information 
(absent a narrow category of very serious harms, such as threats to 
ongoing military operations). That regime, he suggested, would re-
sult in an “unruly contest” between a government biased toward 
secrecy and journalists biased toward disclosure; the contest would 
produce an “optimal” level of social disclosure overall.
10
●  The American system of criminal procedure has been com-
pared to a market in which legislatures set background entitle-
ments, and the “price” of crime is set by decentralized bargaining 
over sentences among prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges.
11
●  James Fitzjames Stephen argued that although “the inquisi-
torial theory of criminal procedure is beyond all question the true 
one,” and a trial “ought to be a public inquiry into the truth,” 
nonetheless 
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). Madison’s pluralism was sharply qualified: he distin-
guished “natural” from “artificial” parties, and argued that “the expediency, in poli-
tics, of making natural parties, mutual checks on each other” did not support creating 
artificial parties “in order to form them into mutual checks.” James Madison, Parties, 
supra, at 505. Because the checking solution is a second-best remedy adopted only 
because natural parties are “unavoidable,” id. at 504, that solution is not to be af-
firmatively chosen where necessity does not require it. 
7 See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 321–22. 
8 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 39 (1859). 
9 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
10 Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 86–87 (1975). 
11 Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 
289, 292–98 (1983). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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it may be, and probably is, the case, that in our own time and 
country, the best manner of conducting such an inquiry is to con-
sider the trial mainly as a litigation, and to allow each party to 
say all that can be said in support of their own view; just as the 
best means of arriving at the truth in respect of any controverted 
matter of opinion might be, to allow those who maintained oppo-
site views to discuss the matter freely and in public.
12
●  In a generalization of Stephen’s claim, one main argument 
for the adversary system of litigation is that decentralized produc-
tion of information by competing parties will produce a closer ap-
proximation to truth than an inquisitorial system. As a corollary, 
some legal ethicists have argued that the adversary system excuses 
advocates from moral obligations that would otherwise attach,
13 al-
though others hotly disagree.
14
●  Law and economics theorists have suggested that under cer-
tain conditions the common law will evolve towards efficiency, in 
the sense that the rules maximize aggregate wealth. In the classic 
models, efficiency arises because inefficient precedents impose 
deadweight losses and are thus more likely to be challenged.
15 A 
more recent variant considers conditions under which the common 
law evolves towards a type of informational efficiency, in the sense 
that all material distinctions are incorporated into the legal rules.
16 
In both classes of models, efficiency arises through an invisible-
hand process, as the unintended byproduct of action by litigants 
and judges. 
12 James Fitzjames Stephen, A General View of the Criminal Law of England 166 
(1863). 
13 See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics 
119–22 (3d ed. 2004). 
14 See infra notes 51, 96. 
15 Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51, 53–55 
(1977); see also George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Ef-
ficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65, 66–69 (1977). For an overview of the literature, see 
Paul H. Rubin, Why Was the Common Law Efficient? 2–9 (Emory Law & Econ. Re-
search Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-06, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=498645. 
16 Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. Pol. 
Econ. 43, 60–61 (2007). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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●  The economist Harold Demsetz suggested
17 that “property 
rights emerge when the social benefits of establishing such rights 
exceed their social costs.”
18 Although Demsetz’s original argument 
took no clear position on whether this development required a 
“conscious endeavor,”
19 later reconstructions posit an invisible-
hand process in which efficient property rights evolve as the unin-
tended consequence of decentralized action.
20
Put side by side, these arguments are highly heterogeneous, yet 
they also display important common features. The common ground 
is that in every case some good arises as an unintended byproduct 
of decentralized action. There are also notable differences among 
them, the major one being that the various justifications point to 
different goods, such as liberty, welfare, and truth. To sort all of 
this out, I will begin by attempting to elicit the conceptual structure 
of invisible-hand justifications—as briefly as possible, for it is true 
of both invisible-hand explanations and invisible-hand justifica-
tions that “[t]he definitional details of what counts as ‘invisible 
hand’ are less interesting than the particular theories.”
21
I suggest that an invisible-hand justification combines (1) an ex-
planation that identifies an invisible-hand process with (2) a value 
theory that identifies some social benefit arising from the invisible-
hand process and (3) a mechanism that explains how the invisible-
hand process produces that benefit. As to condition (1), I will fol-
low Ullmann-Margalit in supposing that an interesting invisible-
hand explanation is one that takes as an input the preferences (or 
desires or goals) and beliefs of agents,
22 and that yields as an output 
17 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 
350 (1967). 
18 Thomas W. Merrill, The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 
J. Legal Stud. S331, S331 (2002). 
19 Demsetz, supra note 17, at 350. 
20 See, e.g., James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 
95 Cornell L. Rev. 139, 147 (2009). 
21 Robert Nozick, Invisible-Hand Explanations, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 314, 314 (1994). 
22 The agents might be individuals or institutional actors, such as states in interna-
tional relations theory, or lawmaking institutions in the Madisonian invisible-hand 
account of the separation of powers. Methodological individualists will add that the 
behavior of the institutions is in principle reducible to statements about individuals, 
but for my purposes the validity of this claim is irrelevant. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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a structured pattern of behavior.
23 The invisible-hand explanation 
substitutes for an explanation from design, based upon the inten-
tional action of some designer(s).
24 A hallmark of invisible-hand 
explanations is that none of the participants within the system need 
intend to bring about the structured pattern that arises from their 
actions.
25
This does not entail, however, that the invisible-hand system 
must itself emerge through an invisible-hand process, although it 
may do so. The emergence and the operation of invisible-hand sys-
tems are different questions.
26 Some explicit markets, for example, 
grow up through the decentralized action of many participants, 
whereas others arise as the result of intentional action, as when 
regulators design and impose a system of emissions trading. Thus 
top-level managers at Hewlett-Packard set up an internal predic-
tion market in which mid-level managers would place bets on the 
firm’s sales in future periods—bets that, when aggregated by the 
prediction market, in effect collected and transmitted to their supe-
riors valuable information that was previously dispersed through-
out the firm.
27
The list of invisible-hand justifications in legal and political the-
ory is heterogeneous on this dimension. Some arguments, such as 
the claims that the common law and property rights evolve towards 
efficiency, are diachronic and focus on the genesis of institutions or 
rules. Others are synchronic and focus on the operation of institu-
tions or rules at a given time, regardless of how those institutions 
23 Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Invisible-Hand Explanations, 39 Synthese 263, 270 
(1978). 
24 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 18–19 (1974). 
25 This excludes mechanisms such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which shows that 
under certain conditions, the competence of a group of sincere voters using majority 
rule will exceed the average competence of its members. When the Theorem’s condi-
tions hold, the Law of Large Numbers amplifies individual competence, but in the 
usual interpretation, the individuals are assumed to be attempting to figure out the 
right answer for the group; thus the right answer does not arise as an unintended by-
product of their actions. For a full statement of this theory, see Adrian Vermeule, 
Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. Legal Analysis 1, 4–9 (2009). 
26 Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 23, at 275. 
27 Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J. Econ. Persp. 107, 122 
(2004) (citing Charles R. Plott & Kay-Yut Chen, Information-Aggregation Mecha-
nisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem 10–12 
(Cal. Inst. Tech., Social Science Working Paper No. 1131, 2002)); Note, Prediction 
Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1221 (2009). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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or rules originated. The Madisonian argument for the separation of 
powers attempts to justify an invisible-hand arrangement that re-
sults from an intentional act of constitutional design, rather than 
arising through an invisible-hand process. Yet the same argument 
could be used to justify a separation of powers regime that evolved 
organically, as in legal systems that have no written constitution. 
An explanation that satisfies condition (1) posits an equilibrium 
or spontaneous order; it thus excludes random or chaotic behavior. 
Merely satisfying condition (1), however, need not at all imply that 
the spontaneous order is in any way desirable or beneficial.
28 The 
“tragedy of the commons,” for example, is a spontaneously arising 
structured equilibrium of waste and inefficiency. Accordingly, con-
dition (2) requires the theorist to posit some normative good that 
the spontaneous order produces, turning the explanation into a jus-
tification. 
On this dimension as well, invisible-hand justifications are highly 
heterogeneous. In the neoclassical argument for markets, the rele-
vant good is welfare, which markets are said to maximize. In a 
more recent version, the argument is that the market mechanism 
conduces to freedom, understood as the realization of individual 
opportunities and autonomy.
29 In the Madisonian arguments for 
the separation of powers and for a plurality of parties, the main 
good is political liberty, although Madison also assumed that free-
dom from factional oppression would conduce to “justice and the 
general good.”
30 In the Holmesian argument for the marketplace of 
ideas, the relevant good is truth or, less grandly, information; the 
same goods are relevant under Stephen’s argument for the adver-
sary system of litigation.
31
Moreover, these goods may be combined in complex ways. The 
Hayekian variant of the argument for explicit markets has a hybrid 
character: welfare is still the ultimate good that markets produce, 
but instead of being produced directly by the consummation of all 
desired trades as in the neoclassical argument, welfare is produced 
indirectly by the market’s ability to exploit dispersed information 
28 Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. Econ. Persp. 85, 93–94 (1989). 
29 Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom 501–30 (2002). 
30 The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 322. 
31 See supra notes 9, 12. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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and even generate information that would not otherwise exist.
32 
This contrast, between a welfarist and an informational argument 
for markets, is analogous to the contrasting arguments for the effi-
ciency of the common law: the standard argument focuses exclu-
sively on wealth maximization through the weeding out of ineffi-
cient rules, while a more recent hybrid argument suggests that the 
common law evolves towards informational efficiency. 
Given all this heterogeneity, it is reasonable to question whether 
there is even a coherent category of invisible-hand justifications in 
the first place. I believe that the common structure of these argu-
ments, in which the relevant goods are produced as the unintended 
byproduct of decentralized action, gives rise to important common 
problems, but the proof of this must emerge from the subsequent 
discussion. Most of the points I will make in Parts II through IV 
are addressed to the common structure of the arguments and thus 
do not depend upon whether the argument has a diachronic or syn-
chronic character, or upon the nature of the good to which the ar-
gument appeals. That said, the dilemma discussed in Part IV—that 
the justification of competition as a discovery procedure creates 
empirical questions that by definition cannot be tested, at least in 
interesting cases—applies by its terms only where truth or informa-
tion is the relevant good. 
Condition (3) requires the analyst to supply a mechanism that 
aligns the structured pattern or spontaneous order of condition (1) 
with the social benefit identified to satisfy condition (2). For con-
creteness, and to set a benchmark case, consider the economic ar-
gument for free markets in ordinary goods. In the standard wel-
fare-economic interpretation of Smith’s cursory references to the 
“invisible hand,” the operation of the price system in perfectly 
competitive markets will produce long-run allocative and produc-
tive efficiency in which net social benefits are maximized.
33 By 
definition, the conditions of allocative and productive efficiency 
also entail Pareto efficiency. In this argument, the price system is 
the relevant mechanism (condition 3) that ensures that the behav-
32 However, because market participants have incentives to free-ride on the infor-
mation generated by others, full informational efficiency in markets is impossible. See 
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Ef-
ficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1980). 
33 See Grampp, supra note 1, at 445–46. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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ior of actors under perfect competition produces an equilibrium 
(condition 1) that maximizes social welfare (condition 2). 
In a number of invisible-hand justifications, this third condition 
either is not clearly satisfied or is clearly not satisfied. As an exam-
ple of the former problem, the argument that decentralized bar-
gaining in the American system of criminal procedure creates a 
“market price” for crime does not clearly posit any mechanism that 
aligns individual behavior with the relevant good, here social wel-
fare.
34 The sentences themselves, whether set in terms of jail time 
or in monetary fines, are numerical, continuously graded, and plau-
sibly commensurable, so that the analogy to the price system is at 
least somewhat plausible. It is hardly clear, however, that this suf-
fices to align private and social costs. Genuinely irrational actors, 
insensitive to price changes, might be selected out of markets 
through bankruptcy but selected into the criminal system by their 
inability to respond to the law’s deterrent signals. Although 
changes in the “price” of crime through increased sentences will af-
fect rational criminals and thus change behavior at the margin,
35 if 
the fraction of rational criminals is very small, those changes will 
also be marginal in the colloquial sense. Furthermore, punishment 
through incarceration, as opposed to fines, builds in a systematic 
misalignment between private and social costs, because the pun-
ishment itself requires social expenditures for prisons and guards.
36 
That extra social cost cannot be entirely folded into the private cost 
of crime by increasing the expected sentence, because the social 
cost would then increase as well—unless the costs of running the 
prison system are all fixed, rather than marginal, costs, which is 
implausible. 
More generally, the system of criminal procedure might be bet-
ter described not as a genuine market but as a system of sequential 
decisionmaking by autonomous monopolies, in which the prosecu-
tor has near-unchecked discretion over whether to charge a crime, 
the jury has near-unchecked discretion over whether to acquit, and 
the judicial system has near-unchecked discretion over final review 
of convictions. Although the prosecutor bargains with the defen-
34 See Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 289. 
35 Id. at 291. 
36 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 223 (7th ed. 2007). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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dant’s lawyer over the conditions of the plea, the relevant “prices” 
are set by the parties’ anticipation of what the judge and jury might 
eventually do, and there is no bargaining between the prosecutor 
and the jury, the prosecutor and the judges, or the jury and the 
judges. In competitive markets, by contrast, the price at which A 
will buy from B is defined by the terms A and B could agree to 
with another buyer and seller, not by the terms some third party 
would impose upon them. Even if there were simultaneous bar-
gaining among prosecutor, jury, judge, and defendant, the theory 
of bargaining under multilateral monopoly is notoriously indeter-
minate, so it would be hard to say whether a system of this sort 
conduces to efficiency, however defined. The market analogy here 
is thus noticeably attenuated. 
An example of clear failure to satisfy the third condition is Dem-
setz’s original argument for the evolution of efficient property 
rights, which posited conditions under which such rights would be 
socially efficient but offered no mechanism to explain why the 
relevant groups would move toward the efficient regime. Later 
analysts have attempted to supply such a mechanism by positing 
various invisible-hand processes conducing to efficiency, yet there 
are equally plausible interest-group accounts suggesting that prop-
erty rights need not be efficient at all.
37 The latter accounts parallel 
a standard argument that the common law need not evolve to effi-
ciency. Repeat players, such as organized interest groups, have su-
perior access to courts or differential stakes in judicial precedent 
and will bias the selection of cases for litigation, thereby skewing 
the precedents that result.
38
More controversially, I believe that Madison’s invisible-hand ar-
gument for a system of separated powers clearly fails to satisfy the 
third condition. Although stemming rather directly from Adam 
Smith,
39 Madison’s argument is dissimilar in a critical respect: it 
does not specify any mechanism that aligns the “private” costs and 
37 See Merrill, supra note 18, at S336–37. For the point that property rights may not 
evolve towards efficiency because of interest-group pressures, see Saul Levmore, Two 
Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S421, S429–43 
(2002). 
38 For references and a discussion of some of the problems, see Adrian Vermeule, 
Law and the Limits of Reason 106–07 (2009). 
39 See Fleischacker, supra note 3, at 897–98, 905–15; Prindle, supra note 3, at 223. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
1428  Virginia Law Review [Vol.  96:1417 
 
benefits to institutions with social costs and benefits.
40 The decen-
tralized bargaining among institutions that characterizes the sepa-
ration of powers contains nothing remotely resembling a well-
defined system of explicit or implicit prices, not even in the broad 
sense in which criminal sentences are prices. There is no systematic 
reason to think that this sort of bargaining will produce efficient 
outcomes, somehow defined, or other benefits such as the protec-
tion of liberty. 
The Coase theorem holds that where transaction costs are zero, 
actors will bargain to efficient outcomes, whatever the initial allo-
cation of entitlements. In the limiting case, the Coase theorem im-
plies that any institutional structure is irrelevant, because actors 
will simply bargain around it. By contrast, the separation of powers 
presupposes that standing institutional forms matter and cannot be 
costlessly dissolved and reformed on an ad hoc basis.
41 The conse-
quence, however, is that a system of separated powers creates ex-
ternalities that cannot always be internalized through bargaining; 
separated institutions may inflict externalities upon one another 
that represent real social losses, not merely transfers.
42
In any event, of course, the transaction costs of bargaining within 
a system of separated powers are much greater than zero; they in-
clude all manner of posturing, pandering, bluffing, brinkmanship, 
and holdouts. What are the properties of such a system? The legis-
lature, President, and judiciary do bargain repeatedly over similar 
issues, and this produces something that vaguely resembles a mar-
ketplace for policies. Yet there are two major stumbling blocks to 
believing that this marketplace is efficient in any sense. First, the 
institutions are themselves aggregates of individual officials with 
competing agendas, and with a great deal of agency slack between 
40 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 991, 1032–33 (2008); Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Con-
stitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 27 (2009). 
41 For this reason, models in which the separation of powers produces welfare bene-
fits must assume constraints on bargaining or collusion by institutions. See, e.g., Tor-
sten Persson, Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, Separation of Powers and Political 
Accountability, 112 Q.J. Econ. 1163, 1165–66 (1997). 
42 Thus another plausible model of the separation of powers shows that (1) absent 
bargaining, the separation of powers produces externalities between institutions and 
thus harms welfare, and (2) even with bargaining, the separation of powers can never 
do better than simple unitary government. See Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, A 
Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers, 6 J. Theoretical Pol. 345, 346 (1994). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
2010]  The Invisible Hand 1429 
 
their own interests and that of the institution as such, and, espe-
cially in Congress, there exist severe costs of coordination and col-
lective action.
43 It thus requires an elaborate analysis of particular 
cases to decide whether bargains among the institutions efficiently 
serve even the interests of their members, let alone the interests of 
the ultimate principals—the citizens or voters. 
Second, even if institutions were internally unified, severe com-
mitment problems cripple the marketplace for policies. There is no 
institution external to government that can enforce agreements 
reached through institutional bargaining;
44 this absence of enforce-
able contracting remits the parties to self-help and tit-for-tat 
mechanisms in which cooperation is merely one equilibrium. These 
two problems reinforce one another, because the turnover of per-
sonnel within institutions undermines the reputational mechanisms 
that can sometimes produce long-term cooperation even where 
agreements are unenforceable. Under these conditions there is no 
reason to think that institutional bargaining over policies produces 
efficient results, and there can be no political Coase theorem.
45
All this suggests that there is no general welfarist argument for 
the separation of powers, but as we have seen, the relevant good 
may be political liberty, not welfare. Perhaps Madison’s argument 
should be understood to claim that the separation of powers will 
protect liberty in some rough-and-ready way, by raising the costs of 
enacting new legislation. On this argument, the transaction costs of 
the system are a virtue, not a vice. 
The separation of powers at the national level, however, only 
makes it difficult to enact federal legislation, remitting individuals 
to whatever rights they may or may not enjoy under other sources 
of law, including potentially oppressive state and local laws; the 
federal government’s internal separation of powers protects feder-
alism,
46 not liberty per se. When the multiple veto points of the fed-
43 On the divergence between institutional and individual interests, see Daryl J. Lev-
inson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 
923–37, 951–53 (2005). 
44 Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Con-
straints 58, 94–95 (2000). 
45 Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Com-
mitment, and Politics, 31 J. Comp. Econ. 620, 622–23, 638 (2003). 
46 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1321, 1458 (2001). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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eral lawmaking process block legislation that would immunize in-
dividual liberty from state and local infringements, liberty interests 
are harmed, not protected. Even in a unitary, rather than federal, 
lawmaking system, private action might itself impair liberty, and 
the separation of powers would then block lawmaking that would 
protect liberty from private infringements. At best, then, the sepa-
ration of powers produces a liberty-liberty tradeoff, and there is no 
general mechanism ensuring that the tradeoff will be struck so as to 
maximize liberty overall. The upshot is that bargaining within a 
system of separated powers, even if it produces short-run mutual 
advantage for the institutions involved, will have no systematic 
tendency either to protect liberty or to produce efficient outcomes 
for society generally.
47
A separate and equally serious problem is that Madison’s argu-
ment does not clearly specify a mechanism by which the separation 
of powers generates spontaneous order in the first place. Not only 
is the system not necessarily socially beneficial, either in terms of 
welfare or liberty, as I have just argued, it may not even amount to 
a well-structured system at all. If this is so, the system’s outcomes 
will represent a random walk depending upon a succession of po-
litical contingencies and the accidents of history. The argument 
may thus fail condition (1) as well as condition (3). 
So far I have suggested three necessary conditions for invisible-
hand justifications and offered examples of arguments that fail one 
or more of the conditions. Even if all three conditions are met, 
however, all that results is a “cogent” invisible-hand justification 
(borrowing the term that Ullmann-Margalit applies to invisible-
hand explanations).
48 The cogent explanation might or might not be 
true, and might or might not be justified in the sense that it is war-
ranted by a rational assessment of the evidence. However, a major 
complication in assessing the truth or evidentiary warrant for in-
visible-hand justifications is that their proponents often argue that 
they are useful precisely because they disclose information to 
which there are no other means of access. I shall return to these is-
sues in Part IV. 
47 McGinnis acknowledges that the “spontaneous order” arising from the separation 
of powers is unlikely to promote either liberty or social welfare as a general matter. 
McGinnis, supra note 4, at 303. 
48 Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 23, at 274. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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Moreover, even if an invisible-hand justification is both cogent 
and true, or at least justified, it need not be dispositive. There is 
always a further comparative institutional question: even given that 
an invisible-hand process can be shown to produce some social 
benefit, would an alternative institutional arrangement produce the 
same benefit at lower cost, produce more of the benefit at the same 
cost, or produce greater net benefits at higher cost? These ques-
tions become relevant in cases where institutional designers face 
the choice whether to set up invisible-hand processes to achieve 
their ends or instead to use other approaches. Although Hewlett-
Packard’s internal prediction market worked well,
49 it is possible 
that alternative arrangements lacking the invisible-hand character 
of the prediction market would have worked equally well or even 
better. Consider, for example, a survey of mid-level managers 
about whether they expect to meet production and sales targets, 
combined with a credible promise that the survey will be con-
ducted on an anonymous basis, perhaps by an independent firm. In 
such cases, the choice between an invisible-hand arrangement and 
some other arrangement is a matter for ordinary cost-benefit 
analysis. 
It is obviously somewhat arbitrary to separate out the three con-
ditions specified above, for the cogency of invisible-hand justifica-
tions, from the further questions whether such justifications are 
true and dispositive. Although nothing of substance turns on this, I 
believe that the cogency conditions demarcate conditions under 
which an invisible-hand justification is in some sense entitled to 
compete in the marketplace of ideas with other institutional ar-
rangements, justified by other types of arguments. If the invisible-
hand justification fails because the evidence does not support it, or 
because there are superior alternatives, these are venial sins, 
whereas a failure to satisfy the cogency conditions means that the 
invisible-hand justification is in some sense spurious, and perhaps 
ideological. 
II. THE DILEMMA OF NORMS 
I turn now to the first of three dilemmas that bedevil invisible-
hand justifications and that cut across local debates and institutions 
49 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 113. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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in which such justifications are offered. To be clear, I do not sug-
gest that each of these dilemmas applies to every invisible-hand 
justification, or that these dilemmas apply only to invisible-hand 
justifications, as some of them apply in other contexts as well. I 
merely suggest that (1) each of these dilemmas applies to more 
than one invisible-hand justification, and thus transcends particular 
questions or debates within legal and political theory, and (2) every 
invisible-hand justification (of which I am aware) runs into one or 
more of these dilemmas, and for systematic reasons. 
I begin with a set of problems arising from the role of norms in 
invisible-hand arguments. “Norms” are notoriously hard to define, 
but a rough cut suffices for my purposes: by norms, I mean rules of 
conduct that oblige agents to act in a way inconsistent with their 
short-run interests. As we shall see, one of the issues about norms 
is whether and when they actually serve the agents’ long-run inter-
ests. I also mean to be agnostic on the question whether norms are 
(ever) genuinely internalized or are observed only because agents 
anticipate that violations of the norms will cause others to sanction 
them.
50
Norms can be social, moral, legal, or political; professional 
norms, such as rules of conduct for lawyers and doctors, have a hy-
brid character composed of social, moral, legal, and political ele-
ments simultaneously. An important twist is that professional 
norms will sometimes require the professional to give effect to the 
self-interest of the client, as when lawyers argue that their profes-
sional role requires zealous advocacy of the client’s interests. In 
cases of this sort, the contrast between norm-governed behavior 
and self-interested behavior can be recast as a tension between 
generally applicable norms of ethics or altruism, on the one hand, 
and the professional norms of specialized agents such as lawyers, 
on the other. The points I will offer are the same under either de-
scription of the problem. 
Do norms promote or frustrate the working of the invisible 
hand? Both answers have champions. Academic moralists typi-
cally, and economists occasionally, suggest that moral norms of 
50 The literature on these issues is vast. Clear treatments include: Jon Elster, The 
Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order 97–151 (1989); Eric A. Posner, Law and 
Social Norms (2002). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
2010]  The Invisible Hand 1433 
 
good faith and fair dealing are indispensable to the operation of 
markets: “[G]ood consequences in equilibrium will depend on at 
least some voluntary compliance with nonlegal prescriptions.”
51 In 
the standard rendition of this claim, norms are indispensable to 
producing social benefits in situations of market failure. In explicit 
economic markets, for example, the costs of contracting and en-
forcing contracts make it impossible to exclude all forms of literal-
ism, circumvention of promises, and chicanery; norms of good faith 
are thus necessary to facilitate efficient exchange.
52 Likewise, in a 
“market for lemons” characterized by asymmetric information and 
experience goods or credence goods, norms of truthfulness or hon-
esty are necessary to prevent exploitation and unraveling.
53 In the 
market for commercial blood donations, as of 1972, the “detection 
[of hepatitis in the donated blood] depend[ed] essentially on the 
willingness of the donor to state correctly whether or not he is suf-
fering from that disease.”
54
Similar arguments have been applied to invisible-hand justifica-
tions for legal and political institutions. On one account of pluralist 
competition among political parties, partisanship is positively bene-
ficial, but only so long as it occurs within a framework of “regu-
lated rivalry” in which “[p]arty conflict entails political self-
discipline—institutionalized, eventually legalized, internalized, and 
made moral habit.”
55 This “Ethic of Partisanship”
56 is necessary to 
keep partisan competition within bounds. Similarly, it has been ar-
gued that the market for ideas functions well only because, and to 
the extent that, participants observe norms of truth-seeking. On 
this view, truth does not arise as an unintended byproduct of self-
interested behavior: 
[H]istorians, for example, might arrive at a better and deeper 
understanding of historical events through an open and unfet-
51 Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public 
and Professional Life 196 (1999). 
52 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 Pub. Pol’y 
303, 313–15 (1973). 
53 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 489–91, 495 (1970). 
54 Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 Phil. Pub. Aff. 343, 345 (1972). 
55 Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 125. 
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tered discussion of historical evidence and alternative hypothe-
ses. But the process works because the participants are commit-
ted to some conception of the truth and observe various stan-
dards in their presentation and assessment of evidence and 
theories.
57  
Finally, a standard critique of the adversary system of litigation 
holds that the trial cannot serve as a truth-finding device if lawyers 
aim solely for victory and do not observe any norms of respect for 
truth.
58
The contrary view, according to which norms hamper markets, 
tends to be held by economists and political scientists, rather than 
professional moralists, and can take either of two forms. In the first 
version, the concern is that partial compliance with norms can be 
worse than either full compliance or no compliance at all. This is 
the dilemma of second best, which I will take up in Part III. In a 
second and stronger version, the concern is that even when they 
are widely observed, norms create friction, rather than lubrication, 
and thus represent a drag on the processes of competition that 
generate a socially beneficial equilibrium in markets or other insti-
tutions. As to explicit markets, an example is the “feudal-shackles 
thesis,” which holds that the persistence of traditional norm-
governed behavior into the bourgeois era hampers the full attain-
ment of the social benefits of capitalism.
59
Norms can create friction in several ways. For one thing, there is 
severe tension between norms of reciprocity, on the one hand, and 
norms of altruism, on the other. Reciprocity can support the gen-
eration of efficient conventions or the production of public goods 
by inducing sanctions against violators or free-riders, but altruism 
can undermine those incentives by causing putative sanctioners to 
empathize with the pain of those who stand to be sanctioned.
60 Fur-
57 William Nelson, The Free Speech/Free Market Analogy: A Comment on Steven 
Lee 4 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.philosophy. 
utah.edu/AMINTAPHIL/2008papers/Nelson%20on%20Lee.doc). 
58 Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 118, 121–24 (1987). 
59 Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society, in Rival Views of Market 
Society and Other Recent Essays 105, 124–32 (1986). 
60 The tension between altruism and reciprocity is identified in Sung-Ha Hwang & 
Samuel Bowles, Is Altruism Bad for Cooperation? 2–3 (June 10, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://people.umass.edu/sungha/iab083108.pdf). In some VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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thermore, norms can create friction not only by dampening self-
interested motivation, but by producing ill-informed action. 
“[E]thically motivated behavior may even have a negative value to 
others if the agent acts without sufficient knowledge of the situa-
tion.”
61
Legal theorists make similar points in various invisible-hand set-
tings, sometimes unwittingly. A leading criticism of Bickel’s contest 
theory, under which a struggle between government and press over 
disclosure of secret information will produce a socially beneficial 
equilibrium, holds that 
the adversarial model on which the [contest] theory relies is both 
odd and inaccurate. It requires an assumption that the govern-
ment and private speakers are locked in combat, with each trying 
constantly to undermine the other. It would be disturbing if such 
a picture mirrored reality. The normal expectations are that the 
press will at least sometimes respect legitimate interests in se-
crecy, and that the government will often promote disclosure on 
its own. If the incentives diverge dramatically from what the 
equilibrium model assumes, the model will break down.
62
This passage combines an implicit normative claim—it would be 
bad if the premises of the contest theory held true—with a causal 
claim—norms of mutual restraint, observed by both government 
and press, are precisely what prevent the contest from working at 
full power. This is an uneasy combination of arguments, for it illus-
trates a larger aspect of the role of norms: if they are friction, 
rather than lubricant, then invisible-hand justifications have the 
cases, altruism might instead support sanctioning of norm-violators or free-riders. 
Under “altruistic punishment,” individuals are willing to incur personal costs to pun-
ish violation of social norms, even without repeated play. In single-shot dictator 
games, in which a Player A can allocate a fixed surplus between herself and a Player 
B, it has been found that a Third Party C who has no stake in the allocation may incur 
a personal cost to punish a Player A who allocates more than half the surplus to her-
self. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 
25 Evolution & Hum. Behav. 63 (2004). The problem, then, can be understood as the 
indeterminacy of altruism: in many contexts, the altruist has to choose between empa-
thy with the party who stands to be sanctioned and empathy with those harmed by 
that party. 
61 Arrow, supra note 54, at 355. 
62 Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 889, 902 
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radical implication that norms are obstructions to be removed. The 
critic quoted above is implicitly attempting to discredit that theory 
by showing that fully implementing the logic of the contest theory 
would require a “disturbing” violation of norms of political moral-
ity. Yet the opposite conclusion might also be drawn: if necessary 
to attain a social optimum, the norms, rather than the theory, 
should give way. 
So far I have tried to lay out two conceptions of the relationship 
between norms and the operation of the invisible hand, involving 
norms as lubrication and as friction, respectively. Can these con-
ceptions be reconciled? Perhaps each is correct, just under differ-
ent circumstances. On this view, where there are serious back-
ground imperfections in the relevant market, norms are necessary 
lubricants, but where markets otherwise operate smoothly, norms 
hamper the attainment of equilibrium through universally self-
interested action. Kenneth Arrow thus states: “I think it best on 
the whole that the requirement of ethical behavior be confined to 
those circumstances where the price system breaks down [because 
of asymmetric information and other market failures].”
63 Norms 
should be turned off where markets function well and turned on 
where they do not.
64
While this reconciliation is attractive in theory, it overlooks that 
norms cannot be perfectly fine-tuned; they cannot be tailored to 
any arbitrarily desired degree of nuance and suspended or acti-
vated at will. For one thing, it is implausible that the same actors 
who behave in a fully self-interested fashion in the absence of mar-
ket failure will be able to adhere fully to a constraining code of 
norms in the presence of market failure. Either self-interested be-
havior will spill over from the domain where it is socially beneficial 
into the domain where it is not, or the constraints that are desirable 
in the latter domain will also shape behavior in the former, where 
they are undesirable. Smith famously quipped that “[p]eople of the 
same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diver-
sion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, 
or in some contrivance to raise prices.”
65 Economic agents who 
63 Arrow, supra note 54, at 354–55. 
64 See Arrow, supra note 52, 304–09. 
65 1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
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ruthlessly seek profits in competitive markets will also tend to col-
lude in order to make markets noncompetitive. The standard rem-
edy is to police those agents through antitrust and competition law, 
but this requires a separate and costly institutional apparatus, ex-
trinsic to Arrow’s norm-based framework. 
For another thing, the processes of reputational sanctioning and 
moral education, by which institutions and individuals force others 
to observe or even to internalize norms, depend for their effective-
ness, in part, on the dogmatic and general character of the norms 
themselves. While some norms take the form of a presumption that 
can be overcome, or a rule-with-exceptions, the principle that ac-
tors should act on the basis of general norms only under conditions 
of “market imperfection” has a different structure, in which the 
norm is rendered wholly operative or inoperative by background 
conditions. Not only is it psychologically costly to switch norms on 
and off in this fashion, but the switching condition is itself ill-
defined. 
There is also a separate problem as to how the requisite norms 
can be generated. In the usual case, norms are not chosen by any-
one in particular, and instead emerge as the unintended byproduct 
of decentralized interactions between and among individuals and 
institutions. Arrow uses a passive verb (“[I]t [is] best . . . that the 
requirement of ethical behavior be confined . . . .”
66) because it is 
mysterious who in society has the capacity to confine norms of 
ethical behavior to all and only those circumstances identified by 
the economic theory of market failures.
67 The supply side of norms 
is their Achilles’ heel.
68 Although there are occasional attempts to 
put forth an explicitly evolutionary theory to the effect that norms 
develop so as to patch up failures of markets, there is no general 
66 Arrow, supra note 54, at 354. 
67 See also Arrow, supra note 52, at 316 (“Ethical codes, if they are to be viable, 
should be limited in their scope [to situations of market failure].”). Which institutions 
or individuals will have both the capacity and the incentive to do the limiting is un-
clear. 
68 Gordon S. Bergsten, On the Role of Social Norms in a Market Economy, 45 Pub. 
Choice 113, 113 (1985) (arguing that the normative economic theory of social norms 
“is flawed because it is not grounded in an understanding of the processes by which 
social norms are created, maintained and enforced”). More recent work, in one sense, 
has corrected this problem by elaborating models of the supply side of norms and, in 
another sense, has exacerbated it by showing that norms need not be efficient. See 
generally Posner, supra note 50; Sugden, supra note 28, at 85–87, 97. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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mechanism sufficiently robust to support such a theory. Inefficient 
conventions can harden into inefficient norms,
69 and even where 
norms would be efficient, their existence will depend upon the pri-
vate costs and benefits to individuals of supporting those norms by 
sanctioning violators or by praising and conferring benefits upon 
entrepreneurs who pioneer efficient norms. The private calculus of 
norm generation and norm enforcement may well diverge from the 
social calculus of norms’ efficiency.
70 Norms are most plausibly effi-
cient within close-knit groups of repeat interactors who collectively 
bear both the costs and benefits of the norms they create, so that 
the group’s internal norms do not impose significant externalities.
71 
Yet such groups are the exception rather than the rule in large-
scale modern economies. 
The proposed reconciliation, then, appears highly contingent 
and imperfect; there is no general reason to think it is feasible. If 
this is right, the lumpiness of norms is, as it were, a kind of imper-
fection in the available technology for coping with market imper-
fections, including imperfections in the implicit markets addressed 
in legal theory. Where norms are lumpy, they are condemned ei-
ther to overshoot the mark or to undershoot it: either norms will be 
absent in some cases of genuine market imperfections, or norms 
will be present in cases where they hamper the operation of mar-
kets. In this respect, the role of norms poses, I believe, a genuine 
and unavoidable dilemma for invisible-hand justifications. 
III. THE DILEMMA OF SECOND BEST 
The last Part explored problems that arise within explicit or im-
plicit markets because of the operation of widely shared norms. 
This Part explores a conceptually distinct possibility: even if norms 
might be beneficial when widely shared, partial compliance with or 
internalization of norms within an explicit or implicit market might 
make things worse, not better. This problem is a special case of the 
69 Sugden, supra note 28, at 93. 
70 See Posner, supra note 50, at 169–79. 
71 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
153–54, 167–68 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 Am. L. 
& Econ. Rev. 1, 31–35 (2001). For an attempt to identify possible mechanisms sup-
porting norm enforcement in broader groups, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social 
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general theory of second best, which holds that if not all of the 
conditions necessary for a system-wide optimum can be fulfilled, it 
is not necessarily or even generally better to fulfill as many as pos-
sible of those conditions.
72 A state of affairs in which only some of 
the relevant variables take on their optimal values may well be in-
ferior to a state in which no variables do so. An implication is that 
piecemeal “improvements,” in the sense that one or a few variables 
are nudged towards their optimal values while others remain 
suboptimal, may make things worse.
73
The general theory of second best connects to invisible-hand jus-
tifications in a systematic way, because the theory implies that the 
interaction among several non-ideal elements can produce an 
overall system that is as close as possible to the ideal. Invisible-
hand justifications, which describe how some collective good arises 
from the interaction of agents whose behavior, taken in isolation, is 
non-ideal, apply this insight in particular settings. By the same 
logic, however, the general theory of second best also implies that 
partial compliance with the conditions for an invisible-hand justifi-
cation can be the worst of all possible worlds. 
Partial compliance can take the form either of asymmetric com-
pliance by some and not others, or else a moderate level of compli-
ance by all.
74 In the former case, asymmetric compliance with or in-
ternalization of norms by some parties and not others can cripple 
processes of bargaining or exchange, as Jon Elster shows: 
Once upon a time two boys found a cake. One of them said, 
“Splendid! I will eat the cake.” The other one said, “No, that is 
not fair! We found the cake together, and we should share and 
share alike, half for you and half for me.” The first boy said, “No, 
I should have the whole cake!” . . . Along came an adult who 
72 R. G. Lipsey & R. K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. 
Econ. Stud. 11, 11–12 (1956). 
73 The belief that any movement towards the systemic optimum, short of full attain-
ment, is nonetheless desirable has been called the “approximation assumption”: the 
fallacious view that the best course of action is the one that approximates an unob-
tainable ideal as closely as possible. See Avishai Margalit, Ideals and Second Bests, in 
Philosophy for Education 77, 77 (Seymour Fox ed., 1983). 
74 See Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in 
Foundations of Social Choice Theory 103, 115–16 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 
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said, “Gentlemen, you shouldn’t fight about this: you should 
compromise. Give him three quarters of the cake.” 
What creates the difficulty here is that the first boy’s preferences 
are allowed to count twice in the social choice mechanism sug-
gested by the adult: once in his expression of them and then 
again in the other boy’s internalized ethic of sharing. And one 
can argue that the outcome is socially inferior to that which 
would have emerged had they both stuck to their selfish prefer-
ences.
75
As for the latter case, Serge-Christophe Kolm has argued, as to 
explicit markets, that although an economy in which all agents are 
fully altruistic could function better than an economy in which all 
agents are fully self-interested, under plausible conditions the 
worst state of affairs would be an economy in which agents are 
partly altruistic.
76 To apply a point made above about the produc-
tion of public goods, for example, fully altruistic agents might take 
into account that failure to sanction non-contributors will hurt all 
concerned, but partly altruistic agents might care about the suffer-
ing of the non-contributor alone, resulting in inadequate sanctions 
and hence inadequate contributions. A slight extension of Kolm’s 
and Elster’s arguments suggests that, while universal compliance 
with or internalization of norms that override self-interested be-
havior may be best of all, partial compliance—either in the sense of 
compliance by some and not others or in the sense of a moderate 
level of compliance by all—may be socially inferior to universal 
norm-free self-interest. 
Problems of partial compliance arise in many invisible-hand set-
tings in legal and political theory. Suppose that a system of pluralist 
competition among political parties requires an internalized “ethic 
of partisanship,” according to which partisans accept an institu-
tionalization of conflict that will result in the parties’ rotation in of-
fice.
77 Suppose also, however, that not all parties internalize this 
ethic: most parties are restrained by norms of democratic behavior, 
75 Id. at 115–16 (quoting Raymond M. Smullyan, This Book Needs No Title: A 
Budget of Living Paradoxes 56 (1980)). 
76 Serge-Christophe Kolm, Altruism and Efficiency, 94 Ethics 18, 33–34 (1983). 
77 See Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 7–10. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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while a few parties seek election only as a stepping-stone to per-
manent domination, intending to exploit democracy in order to 
abolish democracy. The result may be that “the best lack all con-
viction, while the worst [a]re full of passionate intensity,”
78 giving 
an enduring advantage to the parties who unilaterally reject de-
mocratic norms (although on tactical grounds they may pretend to 
accept them for the time being). This is a familiar paradox of de-
mocracy; most democracies address it by placing legal limitations 
on individual freedom to associate with parties that aim to subvert 
democracy itself.
79
Less worrisome configurations are also possible, however. If 
there is a group of self-restrained parties who respect the basic 
framework of democracy, and another group of parties who do not, 
the framework may nonetheless be stable if the latter group is in-
ternally divided between parties of the extreme left and extreme 
right. In that case, the extremes may simply thwart each other’s ef-
forts. Alternatively, although each of the extreme parties may hope 
for total victory, the second preference of each may be to support 
the democratic framework, rather than risk total victory for parties 
at the other extreme. These possibilities emphasize that everything 
depends on the precise distribution of noncompliance across par-
ties. The general theory of second best does not imply that partial 
compliance will always produce the worst of all possible worlds, 
only that it can do so. 
Analogous problems arise in the setting of free speech. Suppose 
that the marketplace of ideas would function best if media institu-
tions observe norms of truth-seeking and responsible balancing of 
all affected interests. Yet if only some media institutions adhere to 
these norms, the resulting state of affairs might be worse than if no 
media observed the norms at all. Political partisans are often heard 
to complain that media institutions are composed of (1) neutral 
gatekeepers and (2) propagandists of the opposite party; this com-
position creates a skew in (what the partisans take to be) the wrong 
direction. When they are logically consequent, these partisans go 
on to argue that the neutral gatekeepers should be replaced by par-
78 William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming” (1920). 
79 For examples of these limitations, see John E. Finn, Electoral Regimes and the 
Proscription of Anti-Democratic Parties, in The Democratic Experience and Political 
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tisans of their own view, producing a “fair and balanced” array of 
viewpoints at the level of the overall system rather than within in-
dividual media firms. 
In this sort of case, partial compliance with the norms of objec-
tive journalism is not a sufficient condition for a distortion to arise. 
One possible configuration, parallel to the happy scenario in which 
extremist parties of left and right cancel each other out, is that 
some media institutions are objective, while others are partisan, yet 
in opposite directions. Here again, partial compliance does not en-
tail the worst of all possible worlds, but it does make the worst-case 
scenario possible. 
In the setting of the separation of powers, similar problems arise 
when some institutions, but only some, pursue Madisonian “ambi-
tion,” while others attempt to promote the public good.
80 Theorists 
of separation of powers frequently argue that a system of universal 
institutional ambition is inferior to a system in which all institutions 
observe norms of mutual self-restraint. On this view, the separation 
of powers “works only if every branch is committed to effective 
governance and is willing to forbear from the deployment of its 
powers to their extreme theoretical limits.”
81 The theorists, how-
ever, usually do not consider the consequences of partial self-
restraint by some institutions and not others. Where this occurs, 
universal institutional ambition may be the best of the attainable 
regimes, even if universal self-restraint would be best of all. 
Suppose, for example, that the President systematically pro-
motes the long-run growth of presidential power, while Congress 
and the Supreme Court act in good faith on the basis of case-by-
case assessments of the public interest—assessments that are in-
trinsically random with respect to presidential power and thus 
sometimes favor its expansion. The long-run consequence will be 
that even though a majority of institutions act in a public-spirited 
way, the system as a whole trends towards greater and greater 
80 I will bracket here all questions about the internal aggregation of preferences 
within institutions and assume that the institutions can be understood as having some-
thing like composite utility functions. On the problems of internal aggregation, see 
generally Levinson, supra note 43. 
81 Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, 
“Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups,” 12 Cornell 
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presidential power, albeit not as quickly as the President taken 
alone would favor. Depending upon what the optimal level of 
presidential power is at any given time, this long-term trend might 
be salutary or harmful. In the latter case, even if the first-best 
would be to have all institutions attempt to promote the public in-
terest as they see it, the attainable second-best might be to have all 
institutions attend strictly to their institutional ambitions, because 
Congress and the Court would then provide a more robust check 
on presidential aggrandizement. 
It might, in other words, be best for the nation if institutions uni-
versally ignore the national interest, or invariably believe that their 
own interests and the national interest are aligned. To be sure, 
there is also a happier scenario: perhaps the President and (say) 
Congress relentlessly promote their respective institutional inter-
ests, while a public-regarding Court balances their claims and thus 
promotes the national interest overall. Needless to say, nothing 
guarantees that this optimistic possibility will actually materialize. 
Depending upon the specific distribution of behavior, partial com-
pliance might mimic the results of full compliance, but might also 
yield the worst possible outcomes. 
A final example involves the role of the prosecutor in an adver-
sarial system of criminal procedure. In the standard view, the 
criminal defense lawyer’s obligation is to act as a zealous advocate 
for the accused, a role frequently justified by the equilibrium the-
ory that vigorous competition between self-interested parties will 
produce more information overall. At the same time, however, the 
standard view holds that the prosecutor’s duty is to “seek[] truth 
and not victims”
82—to act in the interests of public justice, rather 
than as a partisan advocate for conviction. 
These two ideas are patently in some tension with one another. 
One cannot simply say that the prosecutor and the defense lawyer 
have different roles, because the invisible-hand justification for ad-
versarial litigation involves the systemic relationship between the 
two. If the premise is that the defense lawyer may be a zealous ad-
vocate because a system of competitive production of evidence by 
82 Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Att’y Gen., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Sec-
ond Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in Nat’l College of 
District Attorneys, Ethical Considerations in Prosecution: Roles and Functions of the 
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parties best promotes truth overall, it is not obvious how one can 
go on to deny that the other party, namely the prosecutor, should 
be equally entitled to produce evidence in a competitive and parti-
san fashion. A system in which prosecutors but not defense lawyers 
have an obligation to present evidence impartially to the tribunal 
might be the worst of all possible worlds. One can affirm, by brute 
force, that an asymmetric role-morality is most likely to produce 
truth overall, but that position must rest on a different theory than 
the invisible-hand justification for competitive production of evi-
dence, and it is unclear what theory might fill the gap. 
There are three logically consequent approaches to resolving this 
tension. First, one might redefine the defense lawyer’s role to re-
quire disinterested truth-seeking; second, one might redefine the 
prosecutor’s role as that of a zealous advocate for conviction; third, 
one might admit that the combination of zealous defense with im-
partial prosecution compromises the invisible-hand logic of the ad-
versary system, but go on to argue that the compromise is justified 
as a means of introducing a bias in favor of the accused, which is 
desirable on extrinsic grounds. The first solution has its advocates.
83 
As for the second, although I have not found this view endorsed as 
such by any legal commentator, a near relative is the view that the 
prosecutor’s office in effect combines two functions—advocacy and 
impartial judgment—that should be separated, institutionally, by 
having different executive personnel perform the two functions.
84 
The implication is that when litigating, as opposed to performing 
other functions, the prosecutor should be a zealous advocate for 
conviction. 
The third solution probably captures the implicit assumptions of 
many criminal law theorists. On this view, a hybrid adversary sys-
tem for criminal cases, one in which the prosecutor but not the de-
fense has a duty of impartiality, is all of a piece with the require-
ment of a unanimous jury vote to convict, the rule that guilt must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and other built-in protec-
tions for the accused. This skew might in turn be justified by point-
83 Cf. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics 9–10, 
138–39 (1998) (“Lawyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant cir-
cumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.”). 
84 See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in 
a Passionate Pursuit, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1695, 1716 (2000). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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ing to a background imbalance of resources between the state and 
the accused, by a belief that the costs of erroneous conviction are 
much greater than the costs of erroneous acquittal, or both. 
A view of this sort would need much more work, however. Two 
of the more obvious problems are as follows. First, some theory is 
needed to determine how much skew in favor of the defendant is 
socially desirable. Even if one believes that it is better for ten guilty 
defendants to go free than for one innocent defendant to be con-
victed, it is unlikely to be better that a thousand guilty defendants 
should go free.
85 If the background institutions of the jury system 
and of proof beyond a reasonable doubt already build in the right 
amount of skew, then an additional requirement that the prosecu-
tor litigate with one hand tied behind her back in effect double-
counts the defendant’s interests. Second, even if the background 
institutions do not create enough bias in the defendant’s favor, it is 
not obvious why compromising the adversary system of litigation—
stipulating that such a system is otherwise desirable on truth-
production grounds—is the right means for introducing additional 
protections. Given some desirable amount of pro-defendant bias, 
the institutional designer should intervene on the margin that will 
produce the desired bias at the lowest social cost. Expanding juries 
from twelve to fifteen, for example, with a unanimous vote still re-
quired to convict, might be less costly than weakening the invisible 
hand of the adversary system.
86
These examples, I believe, underscore a central dilemma of in-
visible-hand justifications. Where partial compliance would pro-
85 For the many different versions of this ratio in various times and places, see Alex-
ander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173, 174–77 (1997). 
86 This assumes informative voting, in which jurors vote in accordance with their in-
dividual evidentiary signals. With strategic voting, in which jurors draw information 
from the votes of other jurors, increasing the size of the jury may actually increase the 
chances of a unanimous verdict for an erroneous conviction. Jurors will reason that if 
they are pivotal under a unanimity rule, every other juror is voting to convict; and the 
larger the number of jurors, the more powerful this inference becomes. See Timothy 
Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of 
Unanimous Jury Verdicts Under Strategic Voting, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 23, 23 (1998). 
Experiments do not bear out this counterintuitive thesis, however, and indeed the 
“gap between the theoretical predictions and the experimental observations [widens] 
as jury size grows.” Arthur Lupia et al., When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-
Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs and an Application to Jury Theo-
rems, 18 Pol. Analysis 103, 120 n.10 (2010). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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duce the worst possible state of affairs, such justifications are bal-
anced on a razor’s edge: whether full compliance with the invisible-
hand conditions or full rejection of those conditions is best of all, a 
move towards either extreme will represent an improvement. 
Moreover, starting from the state of either full or no compliance, a 
move by small steps towards the other extreme can be blocked by 
the high costs of transition through the worst-case scenario of par-
tial compliance. 
Here, as in other settings, the general theory of second best 
forces legal and political theory to confront the discrepancy be-
tween aspirations and opportunities. Where it is clear that the first-
best is unattainable, this dilemma has no consequences for action; 
there is no pragmatic point in dwelling on what is out of reach, al-
though it may or may not be a socially useful project to engage in 
what David Estlund calls “hopeless aspirational theory.”
87 The di-
lemma has a sharper edge, however, when it is uncertain whether 
the first-best state is or is not attainable. If actors attempt to reach 
it and fail, the very attempt to reach the first-best state will, at least 
in hindsight, represent a costly and fruitless endeavor. 
To make these problems concrete, suppose that in a system of 
separated powers the first-best state is a system in which all 
branches of government behave with a measure of self-restraint, 
yet none are currently doing so. Should any one branch opt for re-
straint, hoping that others will follow its lead? Even if all branches 
have “assurance game” preferences, and would thus prefer to co-
operate if others do so, each may believe that the others have 
“prisoners’ dilemma” preferences, and would thus prefer to defect 
if others cooperate, in which case the cooperators will receive only 
the “sucker’s payoff.”
88 Believing this, no branch will show re-
straint, the beliefs of all branches about the other branches will be 
confirmed in a self-fulfilling fashion,
89 and the system will remain 
87 David M. Estlund, Utopophobia 3 (Feb. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
88 For an overview of assurance games in which players have incomplete information 
about others’ preferences, see Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International 
Relations ch. 2 (2005). 
89 In this sort of self-confirming equilibrium, players’ conjectures about other play-
ers’ strategies are confirmed so long as the conjectures match the other players’ actual 
behavior under the actual circumstances, as opposed to their counterfactual behavior 
under different circumstances. See Lupia et al., supra note 86, at 104–05. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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indefinitely in a second-best state. Alternatively, one branch might 
decide to show restraint regardless of what others do; as we have 
seen, under identifiable conditions this unilateral forbearance will 
produce the worst possible results. 
IV. THE DILEMMA OF VERIFICATION 
Do invisible-hand justifications actually work, in a given do-
main? Across all domains, theorists recognize that the question is 
at least partly empirical. The preferred mode of argument is then 
to implicitly shift the burden of proof to the other side. One criti-
cism of Bickel’s contest theory of free speech, for example, is that 
“[t]he equilibrium theory remains impressionistic and relies on 
premises that are both unsupported and unlikely.”
90 As for the 
broader claim that the marketplace of ideas produces truth, its 
“most prominent weakness” is “[t]he absence of . . . a demonstra-
tion, in the face of numerous counter-examples,” that truth tends 
to prevail over falsehood.
91 Likewise, a standard criticism of the ar-
gument that the adversary system produces truth is that it is merely 
“a hopeful supposition derived from advocacy ideology. There is 
no empirical evidence indicating that the contests of advocates de-
liver truth in this manner.”
92 Such arguments rarely explain why the 
invisible-hand justification should be rejected if there is no evi-
dence for it; the situation is equally compatible with there being no 
evidence against it, and the lack of evidence favoring the invisible-
hand justification is not the same as positive evidence that the justi-
fication fails. The critics, that is, confuse or exploit the distinction 
between absence of evidence and evidence of absence. 
This implicit burden-shifting is the usual stuff of legal argument, 
but I believe that the empirical problems surrounding invisible-
hand justifications go deeper than in many other domains. The key 
problem is that invisible-hand justifications typically include an ex-
press or implied claim that competition serves as a discovery pro-
cedure.
93 The action of participants in express or implied markets 
90 Sunstein, supra note 62, at 904; see also Note, Media Incentives and National Se-
curity Secrets, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2228, 2233–34 (2009). 
91 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 26 (1982). 
92 Goodpaster, supra note 58, at 124. 
93 F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, Institut für Weltwirtschaft 
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itself generates information, to which the analyst may have no 
other means of access. 
Hayek famously made this claim as to explicit economic mar-
kets, yet Hayek also suggested an analogy between markets and 
many other social and political institutions that harness competi-
tion, such as “sporting events, examinations, the awarding of gov-
ernment contracts, [and] the bestowal of prizes for poems, not to 
mention science.”
94 Such institutions, Hayek suggested, are justified 
when and because we do not otherwise know the information that 
the competition is designed to reveal:  
[I]t would be patently absurd to sponsor a contest if we knew in 
advance who the winner would be. . . . The only reason we use 
competition at all has as its necessary consequence the fact that 
the validity of the theory of competition can never be empirically 
verified for those cases in which it is of interest.
95
On the logic of this claim, we might have no independent access 
to the information by which to judge whether an invisible-hand jus-
tification does or does not work. As to explicit markets, the analyst 
who asks the question is a single mind and on Hayekian premises 
can never generate the information that socially distributed knowl-
edge can produce through the price system. In the context of ad-
versary criminal trials, “[w]e can’t learn directly whether the facts 
are really as the trier determined them because we don’t ever find 
out the facts.”
96 This is slightly overstated, because in a tiny fraction 
of cases DNA evidence or other conclusive proof emerges after the 
fact, yet it seems a valid generalization. In the setting of free 
speech, it might be argued—although to my knowledge no one has 
done so—that it is pointless to ask whether the marketplace of 
S. Snow trans., 2002). For an application to legal institutions, see Gregory B. Chris-
tainsen, Law as a Discovery Procedure, 9 Cato J. 497, 499–527 (1990). 
94 Hayek, supra note 93, at 9. 
95 Id. at 10. Hayek may be wrong to put games into this category. Games, unlike ex-
aminations, may not be a means of uncovering independent information; if the game 
is played according to its rules, the outcome is necessarily correct. However, I am un-
sure of this point. It seems perfectly coherent to affirm both that the point of the an-
nual Wimbledon tennis tournament is to determine who is the best tennis player at a 
given time, and also that in a particular year, the winner of the tournament was not 
the best player.  
96 David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers’ 
Roles and Lawyers’ Ethics 83, 93 (David Luban ed., 1983). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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ideas really tends as a general matter to produce truths that cannot 
otherwise be discovered. Putting aside the possibility of divine 
revelation, it is not obvious what independent source of truth could 
be appealed to without begging the question. 
The lack of independent access to the information supposed to 
be generated by competitive processes insulates Hayekian invisi-
ble-hand justifications from criticism, but the price is high. Where 
competition is said to function as a discovery procedure, the suc-
cess of the invisible-hand justification will be empirical but prag-
matically unverifiable.
97 This makes it just as hard for proponents 
of the invisible-hand justification to prove their case as it is for crit-
ics to disprove. 
Given this inherent difficulty of direct access to the necessary 
evidence, proponents and critics fall back upon indirect strategies 
of assessment. For their part, critics examine the inputs into the 
competitive discovery procedure in order to indirectly impeach its 
outputs. A typical response to the informational argument for the 
adversary system, for example, is that it would be astonishing if the 
partisan motivations and rhetorical tricks of advocates tended to 
cancel each other out, rather than simply deepening the jury’s con-
fusion and thus tending to produce random outcomes.
98
The problem with such arguments is that all invisible-hand proc-
esses are astonishing,
99 in the sense that their inputs always seem 
disreputable taken in isolation. A narrow focus on the self-
interested motivations and self-serving actions of individuals in lo-
cal contexts will always make it seem surprising that the aggrega-
tion of individual motives and behaviors could produce social 
goods overall. That is the very point of invisible-hand justifications, 
their central alchemy. It is a straightforward fallacy of composition 
to assume that because market participants are self-interested, the 
market as a whole cannot serve the public interest, however de-
fined. It is equally fallacious to assume that because advocates in 
jury trials use rhetorical tricks, the interaction of their efforts must 
simply sow more confusion. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. at 94. 
99 Cf. Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 23, at 267–68. VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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Conversely, proponents of invisible-hand justifications attempt 
to offer indirect evidence for the epistemic success of competition 
by invoking mechanisms of evolution or social selection. On this 
sort of argument, the relevant institutions can be indirectly shown 
to produce better information by virtue of their competitive suc-
cess in environments where more information is advantageous. 
Hayek, for example, fell back upon the following claim: 
When . . . we do not know in advance the facts we wish to dis-
cover with the help of competition, we are also unable to deter-
mine how effectively competition leads to the discovery of all the 
relevant circumstances that could have been discovered. All that 
can be empirically verified is that societies making use of compe-
tition for this purpose realize this outcome to a greater extent 
than do others—a question which, it seems to me, the history of 
civilization answers emphatically in the affirmative.
100
  Analogous arguments from competitive social selection are le-
gion. Luther Gulick, an American official writing after the Second 
World War, suggested that the Allied democracies had emerged 
victorious over the Axis powers because the principle of free po-
litical speech had allowed democratic governments to learn from 
their mistakes and to correct their policies more quickly than could 
their enemies.
101 On a smaller institutional scale, Hayek also de-
ployed social selection arguments for the common law, describing 
it as a spontaneous order that embodies more latent information 
than a centralized designer of rules could comprehend, and sug-
gesting a competitive advantage for common law legal systems.
102 
Finally, an interesting variant is the argument that the adversary 
system of litigation and the inquisitorial system must be about 
equally good at producing truth: “[I]t would be . . . astounding to 
discover a greater difference in veracity between the Anglo-
American [adversarial] and Continental [inquisitorial] systems, for 
100 Hayek, supra note 93, at 10. 
101 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 146–48 (2003). 
102 See generally 1 F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order 
(1973). For a summary and critique, see Gerald F. Gaus, Hayek on the Evolution of 
Society and Mind, in The Cambridge Companion to Hayek 232, 238–39 (Edward Fe-
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surely such a difference would after so many centuries have be-
come a commonplace in our folklore.”
103
All of these arguments but the last, however, commit the fallacy 
of assuming that what is true of the whole must be true of the parts, 
taken one by one (the fallacy of division). Even if there is selection 
pressure at the level of whole societies, such pressure need not en-
tail that some subsystem within a given society—the free market, 
freedom of political speech, the adversary system, or the common 
law—is superior to an alternative subsystem in other societies. 
Even if social selection exists, it operates on the society as a whole, 
as an integrated total system, and no inference about the society’s 
subsystems follows.
104 Indeed, it might be that the subsystem that 
the analyst praises actually drags down the performance of the 
whole, but not so much as to exceed advantages on other margins. 
Is the lesson of 1989 that free markets are superior to command 
and control economies, or that democratic political systems are su-
perior to authoritarian ones? All that can be observed is that the 
combination of markets plus democracy is superior to the combina-
tion of command and control plus authoritarianism; disentangling 
the causal contribution of each component requires further cases.
105 
Likewise, it might be that the common law or the adversary system 
is a net cost, compared to the civil law and inquisitorial alterna-
tives, but that societies that have the common law or the adversary 
system also tend to have other institutions that give them decisive 
advantages over competitors.
106 In natural selection of biological 
103 Luban, supra note 96, at 93. 
104 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 
664 (1996). 
105 Id. at 665. John E. Roemer, A Future for Socialism 3 (1994), observes that 
“[a]lthough the Communist economies had planning but no markets, they also had 
political dictatorship, a background condition that any experimental designer would 
like to be able to alter.” 
106 A large body of literature claims that the common law produces superior eco-
nomic performance. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 
Q.J. Econ. 1193, 1193–94 (2002); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic 
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. Legal Stud. 503, 514–19 (2001). More recently, 
however, leading proponents of this thesis have modified the claim to say that a gen-
eral free-market orientation—which “even legislation in common law countries ex-
presses”—is the causal factor. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. Econ. Literature 285, 
291 (2008). VERMEULE_POSTPP 9/16/2010 5:26 PM 
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organisms, the analogous phenomenon is pleiotropy, in which 
some genotype that produces both negative and positive traits can 
survive and even spread when its benefits outweigh its costs.
107 That 
the package is optimal does not imply that all of its subparts are 
optimal or even beneficial, taken one by one. 
The suggestion, then, is that the argument from competition as a 
discovery procedure yields questions that are in principle empirical 
yet indeterminate, and that indirect strategies of assessment—
examining inputs or appealing to social or institutional selection—
cannot close the gap. We are left with another genuine dilemma, 
applicable to the subset of invisible-hand justifications that posit 
truth or information as the good produced as the unintended by-
product of individual interaction. 
CONCLUSION 
Invisible-hand justifications are ubiquitous in legal and political 
theory and cannot be judged as a class. Some are more plausible 
than others, and their plausibility varies with varying conditions, as 
I have attempted to show. Where there is a well-defined substitute 
or analogue to the price system of explicit markets, where norms of 
altruism or general morality are unnecessary or positively harmful 
to the operation and stability of the system, and where the relevant 
benefits are hard to produce in other ways, invisible-hand justifica-
tions are most likely to be cogent, whether or not true or disposi-
tive. More fundamentally, invisible-hand justifications face a set of 
recurring dilemmas that arise from their very structure, involving 
the lumpiness of norms, the difficulties of empirical but intrinsi-
cally indeterminate claims, and problems of partial compliance. I 
believe, although this is a speculation, that the existence of these 
dilemmas accounts for the controversial and perennially polarizing 
character of invisible-hand justifications: theorists who appreciate 
only one horn or the other of the relevant dilemmas will vehe-
mently defend or reject such justifications in particular cases. 
Comparing and contrasting a suite of similar justifications in vari-
ous settings, as I have tried to do, may permit a more dispassionate 
evaluation of the invisible hand in legal and political theory. 
107 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sci-
ences 282 (2007). 